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Sharfman: Economic Analysis of Jewish Law

ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF JEWISH LAW
Keith Sharfman *
I.

INTRODUCTION

Like any legal system, Jewish law is amenable to economic
analysis, both positive and normative. 1 Economic analysis can help to
explain how and why the various rules comprising Jewish law arose
and persisted over time. It also can facilitate a direct assessment of
Jewish law on the merits. In practice, however, it is a mainly positive
economic analysis of Jewish law that scholars have emphasized, while
normative analysis has, for the most part, been underemphasized.
Take, for example, the application of law and economics to
biblical exegesis. The legal-economic work in this field has been
largely descriptive rather than prescriptive. 2 Scholars such as Saul

*Professor

of Law & Director of Bankruptcy Studies, St. John’s University School of Law. I
have received helpful input on earlier versions of this paper from participants at a meeting of
the Association of American Law Schools, at conferences at Hebrew University and Touro
Law School, and at a St. John’s University law faculty workshop. Many thanks in particular
to the late Kenneth Arrow and to Robert Aumann, Harry Ballan, Marc DeGirolami, Sheldon
Evans, Dan Klerman, Sam Levine, Saul Levmore, Anna Roberts, Eva Subotnik, and Eli Wald
for especially helpful comments and discussion, and to Deans Michael Simons and Anita
Krishnakumar for financial support.
1 On the distinction between positive and normative economic analysis of law, see RICHARD
A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW §2.2, pp. 31-33 (9th ed. 2014) (defining positive
economic analysis of law as “the attempt to explain legal rules and outcomes as they are” as
distinct from the normative effort “to change [legal rules] to make them better.”).
2 See Geoffrey P. Miller, Ritual and Regulation: A Legal-Economic Interpretation of
Selected Biblical Texts, 22 J. LEG. STUD. 477 (1993); Geoffrey P. Miller, Contracts of Genesis,
22 J. LEG. STUD. 15 (1993); Geoffrey P. Miller, J as Constitutionalist: A Political
Interpretation of Exodus 17:8-16 and Related Texts, 70 CHI. KENT L. REV. 1829 (1995);
Geoffrey P. Miller, Verbal Feud in the Hebrew Bible: Judges 3:12-30 and 19-21, J. Near
Eastern Studies (1996); Geoffrey P. Miller, The Song Of Deborah: A Legal-Economic
Analysis, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2293 (1996); Saul Levmore, Rethinking Comparative Law:
Variety and Uniformity in Ancient and Modern Tort Law, 61 TUL. L. REV. 235 (1986); Saul
Levmore, Ancient Rights and Wrongs: Rethinking Group Responsibility and Strategic Threats
in Biblical Texts and Modern Law, 71 CHI. KENT. L. REV. 85 (1995); see also Robert C.
Ellickson & Charles Dia Thorland, Ancient Land Law: Mesopotamia, Egypt, Israel, 71 CHI.
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Levmore and Geoffrey Miller have argued persuasively that positive
legal-economic analysis can help to explain the existence,
preservation, and structure of various biblical regulations. They argue
that the Hebrew Bible’s regulations are economically predictable. But
they do not try to defend them on normative grounds. 3 As Miller has
explained in a paper narrowly applying positive economic analysis to
the Talmud, “economic analysis of law is the use of economic
principles and reasoning to understand legal materials.” 4 The narrow
goal of positive economic analysis of law, applied to Jewish law as to
other contexts, is thus to understand and explain rather than to justify
the rules and laws under study.
This paper builds on prior work applying economics to Jewish
law. It argues that Jewish law lends itself not only to positive but also
to normative legal-economic analysis. In contrast to prior work
applying economics to biblical interpretation, this paper employs both
positive and normative legal-economic analysis. Three sets of biblical
regulations—those pertaining to lepers, loan agreements, and land
ownership—are studied from both positive and normative
perspectives. And the conclusion reached in each case is that the
regulations at issue are not only predictable as a descriptive matter but
also normatively defensible.
Section II briefly elaborates on the distinction between positive
and normative legal-economic analysis. Section III summarizes some
of the previous uses of positive legal-economic analysis as a tool of
biblical exegesis and notes the prior literature’s underuse of normative
legal-economic analysis as an exegetical device. Section IV introduces
and summarizes certain biblical regulations concerning leprosy, debt
contracts, and land ownership. Section V applies both positive and
KENT L. REV. 321 (1995); GEOFFREY P. MILLER THE ECONOMICS OF ANCIENT LAW (Edward
Elgar Publishing, 2010).
3 An important exception from outside the law and economics field concerning not only
biblical but also rabbinic law is the scholarship of economist Aaron Levine, whose work does
indeed have a normative dimension. See AARON LEVINE, ECONOMIC PUBLIC POLICY AND
JEWISH LAW (1993); AARON LEVINE, ECONOMICS AND JEWISH LAW: HALAKHIC PERSPECTIVES
(1987); AARON LEVINE, THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF JUDAISM & ECONOMICS (2010) (a
collection that includes some essays applying economics to Jewish law from a normative
perspective). See also Samuel Levine, Richard Posner Meets Reb Chaim of Brisk: A
Comparative Study in the Founding of Intellectual Legal Movements, 8 SAN DIEGO INT’L L. J.
95 (2006) (considering economics in relation to Jewish law using a comparativist rather than
a positivist approach); Keith Sharfman, The Law and Economics of Hoarding, 19 LOYOLA
CONSUMER L. REV. 179 (2016) (normatively assessing the Talmudic ban on hoarding).
4 See Geoffrey P. Miller, Law & Economics Versus Economic Analysis of Law, 19 AM.
BANKR. INST. L. REV. 459, 459 (2011).
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normative legal-economic analysis to these regulations. Section VI
concludes.
II.

POSITIVE VERSUS NORMATIVE ANALYSIS

Positive legal-economic analysis is concerned with what “is”
while normative legal-economic analysis is concerned with what
“ought” to be. 5 Elaborating on this distinction will likely be helpful to
those who are unfamiliar with it.
Positive legal-economic analysis seeks to explain why
particular legal rules arise and persist and, somewhat more
ambitiously, seeks to predict the future form that they might take and
the behavioral responses that regulatory changes are likely to produce.
Because positive legal-economic analysis is agnostic as to particular
social goals, it is sometimes claimed to be the more “scientific” and
“objective” of the two modes of analysis. 6 Conclusions reached via
positive legal-economic analysis do not, it is said, depend on valueladen judgments and are therefore less vulnerable to, though certainly
are not immune from, criticism. 7 Positive legal-economic analysis
does depend critically on one key assumption, namely that people are
in the main rational maximizers of their satisfactions. 8 And so to the
extent that this assumption is incorrect, the explanations and
predictions of positive legal-economic analysis are commensurately
less reliable.
Normative legal-economic analysis is more ambitious. It is not
concerned with merely explaining why legal rules arise and persist,
predicting the future course that they likely will take, and predicting
the behavioral responses that changes in them will likely produce. It
is concerned, rather, with assessing whether particular legal rules
enhance or detract from social welfare, that is, with assessing whether
particular legal rules are, at bottom, desirable or not. 9

5 POSNER, supra note 1, at 31-33. On the distinction between “is” and “ought” more
generally, see Karl N. Llewellyn, Some Realism About Realism—Responding to Dean Pound,
44 HARV. L. REV. 1222, 1236 (1931).
6 MILTON FRIEDMAN, The Methodology of Positive Economics, in ESSAYS IN POSITIVE
ECONOMICS, 3-43 (1966), at pp. 3-4.
7 Id. at 4.
8 POSNER, supra note 1, at 4.
9 David Colander & Huei-Chun Su, Making Sense of Economists’ Positive-Normative
Distinction, 2 J. ECON. METHODOLOGY 157 (2015).

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2020

3

Touro Law Review, Vol. 36, No. 1 [2020], Art. 16

234

TOURO LAW REVIEW

Vol. 36

“Social welfare” is a slippery concept that is susceptible to
many definitions. “Whose welfare?” one might well ask. That of a
particular individual (e.g., a buyer, seller, regulator, judge, criminal,
victim, landowner, etc.), and if so, which? That of a particular group
(e.g., buyers or sellers as a group, a family or a tribe, the citizens of a
particular state or country, etc.), and if so, which? And anyway, how
does one measure welfare? One cannot answer any of these without
applying values from outside the field of economics. 10
A familiar example of divergence between normative and
positive economic analysis is the insoluble debate over whether to use
“Pareto efficiency” or “Kaldor-Hicks efficiency” as the criterion of
social choice. 11 Consider a proposed regulatory change that would
harm A by $5, help B by $10, and leave all others unaffected. Would
the adoption of the proposed change improve economic efficiency?
The Pareto approach answers “no,” because the change leaves A worse
off, and thus we cannot say that adoption of the change would produce
a Pareto improvement. The Kaldor-Hicks approach, by contrast, says
“yes” unambiguously—even if it is known that B is very rich and A is
very poor—because the regulatory change would lead to a net gain in
aggregate social wealth. That is, the wealth gain to B of $10 would
more than offset the $5 loss of wealth to A. Since in principle B could
compensate A for its loss and still be better off (by transferring $5 to
A), the change is better for society (if one’s goal is to maximize social
wealth) even if in practice A’s loss is not compensated. 12
As this example shows, normative analyses (like the choice
between the Pareto and Kaldor-Hicks criteria) ultimately depend on
the subjective values of the decisionmaker, which makes normative
analysis inherently less scientific and objective than its positive analog.
This inherent indeterminacy of normative analysis should not,
however, be a reason to avoid it. In fact, law and economics scholars

10 On the indispensability of values to normative economic analysis, see generally A.C.
PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE (1920).
11 On this debate, see POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW, supra, note 1, §1.2, pp. 13-17
(introducing and summarizing the debate, and defending the Kaldor-Hicks, “wealth
maximization” criterion). On the insolubility of this debate, see Louis Kaplow & Steven
Shavell, Any Non-Individualistic Social Welfare Function Violates the Pareto Principle,
NBER Working Paper No. W7051 (Mar. 1999); Amartya Sen, The Impossibility of a Paretian
Liberal, 78 J. POL. ECON. 152 (1970).
12 POSNER, supra note 1, at 14 (“The Kaldor-Hicks concept is … suggestively called
potential Pareto superiority: The winners could compensate the losers, whether or not they
actually do.”).
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regularly engage in normative analysis in a host of areas, 13 and there is
not any reason to suppose that Jewish law is less amenable to
normativity than other fields.
In the area of biblical exegesis, normative economic analysis is
arguably of special importance, because theological interpretation of
biblical passages involving social regulation becomes difficult if the
regulations are not at least normatively defensible. Normative
defensibility is necessary (though obviously not sufficient) to justify
laws and rules. It is difficult to expect compliance with laws that are
normatively indefensible. If a religious law cannot be defended on
normative grounds, the faithful may come to question the law’s
authority or even its divine origin. So there is much at stake in the
normative evaluation of biblical regulations and Jewish law more
generally, an exercise to which economic theory can contribute
significantly.
III.

PRIOR APPLICATIONS OF ECONOMICS TO JEWISH LAW

Saul Levmore is likely the first law and economics scholar to
offer a positive legal-economic interpretation of a biblical regulation.14
In a 1986 article, Levmore suggests a novel thesis: that economics can
explain the independent development of uniform legal rules across
time and place. As evidence supporting this independent uniformity
hypothesis, Levmore cites the similarity between much of modern tort
law and the tort laws found in the book of Exodus. Significantly, the
focus of Levmore’s article is on whether under economic theory,
biblical tort law is predictable, not on whether it is normatively
desirable. And in the decade following the publication of Levmore’s
article, several other articles appeared similarly applying a legaleconomic approach to biblical law, including four articles by Geoffrey
Miller and another by Levmore. 15
E.g., WILLIAM F. BAXTER, PEOPLE OR PENGUINS: THE CASE FOR OPTIMAL POLLUTION
(1974) (applying normative economic analysis to environmental policy); Edward J.
McCaffery, The Uneasy Case for Wealth Transfer Taxation, 104 YALE L. J. 283 (1994)
(applying normative economic analysis to tax policy). See also, Jules Coleman, The Normative
Basis of Economic Analysis: A Critical Review of Richard Posner’s The Economics of Justice,
34 STAN. L. REV. 1105 (1982) (suggesting that Posner himself engages in normative analysis
through use of the Kaldor-Hicks criterion, which Coleman contends itself embodies normative
judgments that are not value neutral).
14 See Levmore, Rethinking Comparative Law, supra, note 2.
15 See citations to Miller and Levmore, supra, note 2.
13
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Miller’s approach is similar to Levmore’s. Each of Miller’s
articles offers a positive legal-economic interpretation of biblical texts
and largely eschews normative assessment. For example, Miller views
the stories of Adam and Eve in Eden, the fratricide of Cain against
Abel, and the binding of Isaac on Mount Moriah as texts that bolster
the institution of and provide a legitimating ideology for the animal
sacrifice ritual practiced by the priests of ancient Israel. 16 Similarly,
Miller interprets the many and varied contract-like arrangements
reported in the book of Genesis—e.g., Abraham’s purchase from
Ephron of the Cave of Machpelah, Esau’s sale of his birthright to
Jacob, Jacob’s employment agreement with Laban—as a compilation
of contract doctrines that endured because the tale-like form in which
they were recorded made them easy to remember, transmit, and
apply. 17 Finally, Miller suggests that the Song of Deborah in the book
of Judges served “norm-creating” and “norm-enforcing” functions by
clearly and memorably documenting the rights and obligations of a
mutual defense pact among the tribes of ancient Israel. 18 For each of
these biblical texts, the issue for Miller is not whether the rule or
arrangement in the text is normatively desirable but rather simply
whether the text can be explained by the economic incentives of its
protagonists, drafters, transcribers, promoters, and readers.
Inattention to normative defensibility can lead to analysis that
is substantively incomplete. For example, in his earlier work on legaleconomic, biblical interpretation, Miller is particularly careful to offer
his own textual interpretations “without derogation of other
interpretations” 19 and without seeking to undermine “the manytextured meanings already recognized.” 20 However, in his later article
on the account in Exodus of Amalek’s attack on the Israelites soon after
they had left Egypt, Miller is less cautious. Abandoning his
nonjudgmental attitude to alternative textual interpretations, Miller
suggests that a theological interpretation of the Amalek story is
“unconvincing” because “an attack by a threatened group [i.e.,
Amalek] on a large party of hostile trespassers [i.e., the Israelites]

16
17
18
19
20

Miller, Ritual and Regulation, supra, note 2.
Miller, Contracts of Genesis, supra, note 2.
Miller, The Song of Deborah, supra, note 2.
Miller, Ritual and Regulation, supra, note 2 at 479.
Miller, Contracts of Genesis, supra, note 2 at 19.
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hardly seems like the kind of degraded moral evil that would justify
placing the attacker under a ban of eternal enmity.” 21
Miller might also have considered a normative defense of the
anti-Amalek regulations 22 arising out of the Amalek story. He might
have suggested that the command to “blot out the remembrance of
Amalek” is justified on the ground that Amalek inflicted unnecessary
“civilian” casualties by attacking the weak and feeble Israelites at the
“rear” (who possibly included women, children, and the elderly).
Moreover, he might have pointed out how the Amalek regulation
creates incentives for a king of Israel to shift resources away from
discretionary, offensive wars against non-antagonist nations in favor
of (arguably more just) obligatory wars against truly hostile nations.
Wars against Amalek and certain other antagonists of Israel (as well as
all defensive wars) are “obligatory” in the sense that the king need not
obtain permission from the Sanhedrin, the rabbinic high court, to
initiate them. Offensive wars against other nations, by contrast, are
“discretionary” in the sense that the king may not wage them without
the Sanhedrin’s authorization. 23
Given the relative institutional ease with which a king can
launch an offensive war against Amalek as compared to launching one
against a neutral nation, one would expect a king who is otherwise
indifferent between the two options to choose to fight Amalek rather
than a neutral nation so as to avoid having to seek the approval of the
Sanhedrin. A normative assessment using plausible value assumptions
would likely view an attack upon Amalek as morally superior to and
more consistent with Israel’s national interest than an attack on a
heretofore neutral, nonbelligerent nation. So the Amalek regulations
Miller, J as Constitutionalist, supra, note 2 at 1831.
Deuteronomy 25:17-19:
Remember what Amalek did unto thee by the way as ye came forth out of
Egypt; how it met thee by the way, and smote the hindmost of thee, all
that were enfeebled in thy rear, when thou wast faint and weary; and he
feared not God. Therefore it shall be … that though shalt blot out the
remembrance of Amalek from under heaven; thou shalt not forget.
Id. This obligation to blot out Amalek is limited, however, to the circumstance of a refusal to
surrender. See Maimonides, Mishne Torah, hilchoth melachim 6:1 (the command to blot out
Amalek was not genocidal because Amalek, like the seven nations of ancient Canaan, had the
option under Jewish law to surrender without loss of life, as per Deuteronomy 20:10, which
requires Israel first to offer the enemy a chance to surrender before waging war).
23 On the distinction between discretionary and obligatory wars and the King’s powers with
respect to each, see Maimonides, Mishne Torah, hilchoth melachim 5:1-2. See also, David
Flatto, The King and I: The Separation of Powers in Early Hebraic Political Theory, 20 YALE
J. L. & HUMANITIES 61 (2008).
21
22

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2020

7

Touro Law Review, Vol. 36, No. 1 [2020], Art. 16

238

TOURO LAW REVIEW

Vol. 36

have the effect of channeling resources away from wars that are less
likely to be in the national interest to wars that are more likely to be.
Therefore, properly understood, the Amalek texts are normatively
defensible when their effect is assessed in light of how things would
be in their absence.
Miller’s decision not to consider a normative defense of the
Amalek story and its accompanying regulations is a prime example of
the prior literature’s underemphasis of normative analysis. Normative
assessment of the Amalek regulations significantly enhances our
understanding of the Amalek story, and normative analysis of other
biblical regulations can be similarly useful. The remaining sections of
this paper approach three sets of biblical regulations in precisely this
fashion by engaging in both positive and normative analysis.
IV.

BIBLICAL REGULATION OF LEPROSY, LOANS, AND LAND

Leprosy. 24 Biblical law requires that anyone with the
symptoms of “leprosy” 25 be examined and diagnosed by a priest. 26 If
the diagnosis is positive, the priest must pronounce the individual
ritually impure and impose a quarantine until such time as the leprosy
subsides. 27 During the quarantine period, hair covering the leper’s
afflicted areas may not be shaved, 28 his clothing must be torn, the hair
The regulations described below appear in the book of Leviticus, chs. 13 and 14.
Leviticus refers to a skin ailment called “tzara’ath,” which usually is translated as
“leprosy” though may in fact mean another disease (e.g., psoriasis or favus). For convenience,
I shall refer to the tzara’ath disease as leprosy, as it is conventionally translated. I also shall
assume that tzara’ath (however translated) is communicable, which is implicit in the bible’s
use in relation to tzara’ath of the descriptive term “nega,” i.e., “plague” (see, e.g., Leviticus
13:2), which connotes communicability.
26 Leviticus 13:2-3:
When a man shall have in the skin of his flesh [symptoms suggesting] the
plague of leprosy, then he shall be brought unto … the priests. And the
priest shall look on the plague in the skin of the flesh; and if [certain
criteria are met] it is the plague of leprosy; and the priest shall look on
him, and pronounce him unclean.
Id. See also Leviticus 13:9-15 (“When the plague of leprosy is in a man, then he shall be
brought unto the priest. And the priest shall look, and, behold, if [certain criteria are met] the
priest shall look on the raw flesh and pronounce him unclean.”).
27 Leviticus 13:46 (“All the days wherein the plague is in him he shall be unclean; … he
shall dwell alone; without the camp shall his dwelling be.”).
28 Leviticus 13:33 (“the scall shall he not shave”). Relatedly, Deuteronomy 24:8 (“Take
heed of the plague of leprosy, that thou observe diligently, and do according to all the priests
the Levites shall teach you, as I commanded them, so shall you do.”) has been interpreted as
forbidding the leper (or anyone else) to cauterize or pluck out from the leper’s skin identifying
24
25
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on his head may not be cut, and, mantra-like, he must continually
intone the word “unclean.” 29 To end the quarantine, the leper must
obtain a pronouncement from the priest that the leprosy has healed. 30
Then he must (among other ritual obligations) wash his clothes, shave
all his hair, bathe in water, and dwell outside of his tent during his first
seven days upon returning to the camp. 31
The Pentateuch reports only one actual instance of a leprosy
outbreak during the Israelites’ forty years of wandering in the desert.
The case reported is that of Miriam, the sister of Moses and Aaron. 32
Miriam gossips about Moses to Aaron, and as punishment, she
contracts leprosy. Aaron, the High Priest, examines her, diagnoses the
ailment, and then forces her to remain outside the camp for seven days
until the plague subsides. In contrast to the technical and clinical set
of leprosy regulations found in Leviticus, the Miriam story recorded in
Numbers contains an added moral dimension in its suggestion that
leprosy is a consequence of sin and that the leper’s quarantine is
therefore morally just and thus is normatively desirable. 33
Loans. The most significant biblical regulation of loan
contracts is the prohibition against lending (to an Israelite coreligionist) at interest 34 or helping others to engage in such a lending
transaction (e.g., by witnessing, drafting, or guaranteeing a loan
document requiring the payment of interest). 35 Other biblical
signs of the leprosy affliction. See Babylonian Talmud, Shabbath 94b; Maimonides, Mishne
Torah, hilchoth tum’ath tzara’ath, ch. 10, halacha 1.
29 Leviticus 13:45 (“And the leper in whom the plague is, his clothes shall be rent, and the
hair of his head shall go loose, and he shall cover his upper lip, and shall cry: ‘Unclean,
unclean.’”). The Hebrew term ( טמאpronounced “Tah-May”), though rendered by most
translations to mean “unclean,” in fact is best understood to mean “ritually impure,” a kind of
spiritual rather than physical uncleanliness.
30 Leviticus 14:2-3 (“This shall be the law of the leper in the day of his cleansing: he shall
be brought unto the priest. And the priest shall go forth out of the camp; and the priest shall
look, and, behold, if the plague of leprosy be healed in the leper.”).
31 Leviticus 14:8 (“And he that is to be cleansed shall wash his clothes, and shave off all his
hair, and bathe himself in water, and he shall be clean; and after that he may come into the
camp, but shall dwell outside his tent seven days.”)
32 Numbers 12:1-16.
33 See Numbers 12:14 (“And the Lord said unto Moses: ‘If her [Miriam’s] father had but
spit in her face, should she not hide in shame seven days? Let her be shut up without the camp
seven days’”).
34 Leviticus 25:36-37; Deuteronomy 23:20.
35 Exodus 22:24 (“If thou lend money to any of my people, even to the poor with thee, thou
shalt not be to him as a creditor; neither shall ye lay upon him interest”), which is broadly
interpreted by the Babylonian Talmud, Bava Mezia 75b, as prohibiting even the facilitation of
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regulations concerning debt transactions include the debtor’s right to
cancel certain types of debts in each sabbatical year of the 50-year
jubilee cycle (i.e., every seventh year of the first forty-nine), 36 the
prohibition against secured lending to orphans and widows, 37 the
prohibition against dunning or otherwise demanding repayment from
a poor or insolvent debtor, 38 the prohibition against entering the
debtor’s home to repossess collateral, 39 the prohibition against taking
in pledge tools of the trade that are needed by the debtor for his
physical sustenance, 40 the obligation not to refrain from lending to the
poor on account of the imminence of the sabbatical year, 41 and the
obligation to pay workers—whether employees or independent
contractors—on the same day as their work is performed. 42
It is important to note that the prohibition against lending at
interest can be circumvented through a device known as a heter iska
agreement, which in essence partially converts the debt into an equity
instrument and thereby allows the parties to recharacterize the debtor’s

an interest-bearing loan transaction by participating in the transaction as a guarantor, witness,
or scribe.
36 Deuteronomy 15:1-3:
At the end of every seven years thou shalt make a release. And this is the
manner of the release: every creditor shall release that which he hath lent
unto his neighbour; he shall not exact it of his neighbour and his brother;
because the Lord’s release hath been proclaimed. Of a foreigner thou
mayest exact it; but whatsoever of thine is with thy brother thy hand shal
release it.
Id.
37 Deuteronomy 24:17. See also, relatedly, Exodus 22:21 (“Ye shall not afflict any widow
or fatherless child”), which has been interpreted by the Bablyonian Talmud, Shavuoth 45a, as
requiring a creditor seeking to collect a debt from a widow or orphan to swear an oath (i.e., to
meet a higher than normal standard of proof).
38 Exodus 22:24.
39 Deuternonomy 24:10.
40 Deuteronomy 24:6 (prohibiting the pledge of millstones—and by implication other
objects essential to the debtor’s trade—to secure a debt); Deuteronomy 24:12-13 (prohibiting
a creditor from keeping a debtor’s clothing in pledge for more than a day); Exodus 22:25
(same; “If thy at all take thy neighbour’s garment to pledge, thou shalt restore it unto him by
that the sun goeth down”). The U.S. Bankruptcy Code has some similar limitations. 11 U.S.C.
§522(d)(3) (exempting some of a bankruptcy debtor’s household goods from collection by
creditors); 11 U.S.C. §522(d)(6) (exempting certain tools of trade).
41 Deuteronomy 15:9 (“Beware that there not be a base thought in thy heart, saying: ‘The
seventh year, the year of release, is at hand’; thine eye be evil against thy needy brother and
thou give him nought; … it be a sin in thee”). In this connection, note also the general biblical
obligation to be charitable—and to lend— to the poor. Deuteronomy 15:8; Exodus 22:24.
42 Leviticus 19:13; Deuteronomy 24:15.
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interest payments as a return on the creditor’s equity. 43 A modern
alternative to the heter iska that can accomplish the same thing is a
sale-leaseback arrangement, whereby an asset (e.g., a piece of land) is
sold by the would-be debtor to the would-be creditor and then is leased
back from the creditor. The lease payments can be structured in such
a way so as to make them economically indistinguishable from loan
payments with interest. Yet the lease payments would not as a legal
matter be characterized as interest for purposes of Jewish law. 44
The debtor’s right to a debt discharge in the sabbatical year
can similarly be contracted around. One way of doing so is for the
parties to contract for a term structure explicitly contemplating
repayment beyond the sabbatical year. 45 For example, if a loan is made
in the fourth year of the sabbatical cycle and the lending agreement
contemplates from the outset that the loan will not come due for ten
years, then the sabbatical year reached three years after the loan is
made will not discharge the debt. Debt is discharged in the sabbatical
year only once it becomes due, but not if it does not become due until
after the sabbatical year. Alternatively, the parties can anticipate that
if the debt becomes due and remains unpaid in the seventh year, its
cancellation can be avoided through the device of pruzbul, a legal
mechanism that permits the creditor to transfer the debt to the
rabbinical court during the sabbatical year and thereby avoid
discharge, on the theory that only those debts that are “with your
brother [i.e., the creditor]” (Deuteronomy 15:3) are canceled, but not
those that are with the court. 46
Land. Two of the Hebrew Bible’s most significant regulations
affecting the ownership of land are (1) that ancestral lands revert back
to their original owners at the jubilee year (i.e., every fiftieth year)47

43 On heter iska, see J. David Bleich, Hetter Iska, the Permissible Venture: A Device to
Avoid the Prohibition Against Interest Bearing Loans, in AARON LEVINE, THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF JUDAISM AND ECONOMICS, supra note 3, pp. 197-22.
44 Id.; see also Daniel Z. Feldman, The Jewish Prohibition of Interest: Themes, Scopes, and
Contemporary Applications, in LEVINE, THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF JUDAISM AND
ECONOMICS, supra note 3, pp. 239-254.
45 Babylonian Talmud, Makkoth 3b.
46 On avoiding debt discharge in the sabbatical year and the institution of pruzbul, see id. at
tosafoth, s.v. ha-moser; see also Mishna, Sh’vi’ith 10:3-4).
47 Leviticus 25:10, 13:
And ye shall hallow the fiftieth year, and proclaim liberty throughout the
land unto all the inhabitants thereof; it shall be a jubilee unto you; and ye
shall return every man unto his possession, and ye shall return every man
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and thus cannot be sold in perpetuity but rather must in effect be leased
for a fixed term; 48 and (2) landowners are prohibited from cultivating
their land during sabbatical years (i.e., every seventh year) but must
rather allow the land to lie fallow. 49 Other relevant regulations include
the right of sellers of ancestral land and their kin to “redeem” the land
(i.e., exercise an option to buy back the land prior to its automatic
reversion in the jubilee year) 50 and the right of the initial seller of a
dwelling in a walled city to sell the dwelling in perpetuity, with the
option to “redeem” the dwelling (i.e., to buy it back), exercisable
within one year of the initial sale date. 51
As with the prohibition against interest and the discharge of
debts in the seventh year, the prohibition against selling ancestral land
in perpetuity can largely be contracted around. While an explicitly
perpetual sale is not legally feasible, land can be sold for any finite
term, including for a term that will conclude beyond the next jubilee
year (or even beyond multiple jubilee years). So the parties could
stipulate to a sale for a term of, say, 60 years—or for that matter 600
years. So long as the sale is for a fixed, non-perpetual term that
explicitly extends beyond the jubilee year, there is no reversion in the
jubilee year. 52
V.

APPLICATION OF POSITIVE AND NORMATIVE LEGALECONOMIC ANALYSIS TO BIBLICAL REGULATIONS
RELATING TO LEPROSY, LOANS, AND LAND

What accounts for these regulations with respect to leprosy,
loans, and land, and are these regulations normatively defensible?
Economic analysis can help to answer these questions.
unto his family. . . . In this year of jubilee ye shall return every man unto
his possession.
Id.

Leviticus 25:23 (“And the land shall not be sold in perpetuity, for the land is Mine; for ye
are strangers and settlers with me”).
49 Leviticus 25:3-4 (“Six years thou shalt sow thy field … . But in the seventh year shall be
a sabbath of solemn rest ro the land, a sabbath unto the Lord; though shalt neither sow thy
field nor prune they vineyard”); Exodus 23:10-11 (“And six years thou shalt sow thy land . . .
. But the seventh year thou shalt let it rest and lie fallow, that the poor of thy people may eat;
and what they leave the beast of the field shall eat”).
50 Leviticus 25:25-28.
51 Leviticus 25:29-30.
52 Babylonian Talmud, Bava Mezia 79a (interpeting Leviticus 25:23 (“And the land shall
not be sold in perpetuity”)).
48
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Leprosy. An economic interpretation of the leprosy regulations
codified in Leviticus and implemented in the case of Miriam’s
affliction as recounted in the book of Numbers might run as follows.
Positive economic theory suggests that a society the majority of whose
members are not as yet infected but fear becoming infected by a
communicable disease is likely to evolve a regulatory regime that
would result in the early detection and containment of that disease.
That the society’s norms will likely reflect the preferences of the
unafflicted majority is implied by the theory of “public choice” and by
economic models of the private demand for public regulation. 53 And
past experience with the social stigmatization of those diagnosed with
the AIDS virus (and more recently with those who early on tested
positive for Covid-19) offers empirical support for the theory. 54
Positive economic theory thus expects and predicts that nonleprous Israelites—and perhaps all Israelites from an ex ante
perspective—would generally favor a public health regime whose goal
is detection and containment, in which those afflicted with leprosy
would be separated from society until such time as the affliction
subsides. And that is indeed the regulatory regime that the Hebrew
Bible institutes. A reliable and (one hopes) incorruptible specialist—
the priest—is charged with diagnosing the disease and thereafter,
imposing and administering a quarantine. The further requirements
that the leper’s appearance (torn clothing, uncut hair) and speech
(“unclean, unclean”) be regulated in such a way as to make his
affliction easily apparent to passersby similarly promotes the goal of
containment. From the outward manifestations of the leper’s disease,
passersby will know to steer clear. And lepers seeking to evade the
quarantine will have a difficult time, given their appearance,
concealing their leper status.
As a textual matter, note that the rules concerning the leper are
written in the passive voice (e.g., “he shall be brought unto the priest”),
suggesting that third parties with an interest in containing the disease
On the economic theory of public choice, see DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY,
LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION (1991). For an economic model on the
demand for regulation, see George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J.
ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 3 (1971). For extensions to the Stigler model, see Sam Peltzman, Toward
a More General Theory of Regulation, 19 J. LAW & ECON. 211 (1976); Gary S. Becker, A
Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence, 98 Q.J. ECON. 371
(1983).
54 See TOMAS J. PHILIPSON AND RICHARD A. POSNER, PRIVATE CHOICES AND PUBLIC
HEALTH: THE AIDS EPIDEMIC IN AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE (1993).
53
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will see to it that the leper is diagnosed and quarantined. This is
predictable, given that lepers have little incentive to quarantine
themselves. Also, note the further precautions before the leper can
reenter society: hair must be shaved, clothing washed, flesh bathed,
and upon readmission, there must be an additional seven days spent
outside the tent. These regulations, too, seem calculated to contain the
disease.
While the regulations in Leviticus seems relatively
straightforward and can be explained descriptively as a public health
initiative, the passage in Numbers recounting Miriam’s contraction of
the disease is not so easily explained. What purpose is served by the
exclusive recordation of the Miriam story? Surely there must have
been others besides Miriam who became afflicted with leprosy during
the Israelites’ forty years in the desert. For if Miriam’s situation was
unique, why create such an elaborate set of rules just for her? On this
question, Miller’s positive analysis of Esau’s sale of his birthright for
a mess of porridge is instructive. 55 Miller observes that in a world
where recording, learning, and obtaining compliance with legal rules
is costly, one would expect to observe the recordation of only the most
difficult and memorable cases from which easier cases may be inferred
a fortiori. If the leprosy regulations (harsh as they are) are enforceable
against a person of Miriam’s prominence, then surely they must be
stringently enforced against everyone. Surely no exceptions of any
kind can be made, no matter how privileged or highly-placed the leper
might be. The advantage, then, of recording Miriam’s case exclusively
is that knowledge of the “holding” there makes the rule in other leprosy
cases easy to infer. 56
55

Miller, Contracts of Genesis, supra, note 2 at 26:
Why would the hard case be transmitted in oral tradition and the easy cases
not? Because the hard case conveys information in the most economical
fashion. Given the Jacob-Esau story, other fact patterns that might arise
seem a fortiori. In an oral tradition where economy of meaning is at a
premium because of the costs of memorization, it is exactly the hard case
that we would expect to see passed through the culture. The easy cases
will be forgotten for the same reason that we forget the easy cases today:
they simply do not convey as much information.

Id.

Another instance of the phenomenon that Miller identifies is the story of the daughters of
Zelophehad as recounted in Numbers 27:1-11. They successfully litigated against their tribe
before Moses the question whether title to ancestral land in Israel could pass to a man’s
daughters in the absence of any male heirs, or whether instead the land would revert back to
the tribe. Id. at 27:8 (“If a man die, and have no son, then ye shall cause the inheritance to
pass unto his daughter.”). Surely there must have been other property (as well as other types
56
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As a normative matter, it is worth noting that the biblical
regime, while certainly a plausible approach to the problem of leprosy,
is hardly inevitable. There are other ways to curb the spread of disease,
such as through tort or criminal liability. But both of these alternative
solutions would produce suboptimal levels of deterrence. Tort liability
would not deter lepers with low levels of wealth, and criminal liability
could not be imposed in cases where harm is inflicted only negligently
but not intentionally. So a regulatory solution like quarantine is thus
quite plausibly the very best way to deal with epidemiological
problems like leprosy, and therefore the biblical regulation appears to
satisfy a standard of normative defensibility.
Loans. There is already an economic literature that offers both
a positive explanation for the ubiquity of “usury laws” and a normative
assessment of them. 57 Glaeser and Scheinkman suggest that
restrictions on charging interest might be explained, as a positive
matter, by borrowers having disproportionate political clout as
compared to that of lenders (e.g., situations where there is a large
institutional borrower that might benefit from, and hence lobby for,
regulations leading to lower interest charges on loans). They also
suggest that usury laws can be justified on normative grounds as a form
of “social insurance” that smooths consumption over time by
facilitating an arrangement whereby behavioral agents lend in
relatively high wealth, low marginal utility of income periods and
borrow in relatively low wealth, high marginal utility periods of
income.
But Glaeser and Scheinkman do not seek to explain (indeed, it
seems they are unaware of) the fact that, under Jewish law, the usury
laws on the books can be contracted around (and often are), as
explained above. 58 Recognizing that the Bible’s restrictive laws with
respect to debt transactions can be contracted around leads inevitably
of) litigation before Moses. Indeed, we know that therre must have been from the story of
Jethro, who upon observing that his son-in-law Moses “sat to judge the people … from the
morning unto the evening” (Exodus 18:13), devised a justice system whereby lower judges
would judge the people in garden variety cases, with Moses judging them only in the “hard
cases” (Exodus 18:26). So even though there were other cases, the case of Daughters of
Zelophehad v. Tribe (like the cases of Esau v. Jacob and In re Miriam) is exclusively reported
because it is an economizing “hard” case from which easier rules can be inferred.
57 See Edward L. Glaeser & Jose Scheinkman, Neither A Borrower Nor A Lender Be: An
Economic Analysis of Interest Restrictions and Usury Laws, 41 J. L. & ECON. 1 (1998);
GIUSEPPE COCO, CREDIT RATIONING AND THE WELFARE GAIN FROM USURY LAWS, UNIVERSITY
OF EXETER DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS DISCUSSION PAPER (October 1997).
58 See supra notes 45 & 46 along with their accompanying text.

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2020

15

Touro Law Review, Vol. 36, No. 1 [2020], Art. 16

246

TOURO LAW REVIEW

Vol. 36

to the conclusion that the institutional lobbying and consumption
smoothing stories offered by Glaeser and Scheinkman are inapposite
in the Jewish law context, where the regulations cover small consumer
loans in an economically stable, agrarian society. So our task is to
replace their model with contextually more relevant explanations.
The logical place to begin is to ask whether there is any
practical consequence to these lending regulations if they can be
circumvented by contract. Economic analysis suggests that there is
indeed a consequence. The Bible’s regulations forbidding interest and
requiring release in the sabbatical year will, even with the possibility
of contracting around them, continue to have some bite with respect to
“small loan”/ “low stakes” debt transactions. This is because there are
“transaction costs” associated with contracting around the regulations,
and this cost will not be worth incurring in low stakes transactions. 59
One, therefore, should expect the biblical regulations
concerning debt contracts to have two effects on low-principal
borrowers: (1) to reduce the borrowing costs faced by small loan
borrowers who are fortunate enough to obtain financing; and (2) to
reduce the supply of loan funds available for such low stakes
borrowers. Because these effects are offsetting from the perspective
of borrowers, it is difficult to say whether, overall, low stakes
borrowers are helped or harmed by the Bible’s lending restrictions.
But one can say unambiguously that low-principal lenders are harmed
overall. Still, perhaps the harm to them is more than offset by possible
gains to -low-principal borrowers. So long as this redistribution effect
is a real possibility, the identified effects of the regulations are
normatively defensible. Moreover, to the extent that transaction costs
are high enough to make “contracting around” unrealistic in most
cases, the Glaeser & Scheinkman analysis applies—and then looking
at low stakes debt contracts in isolation, the regulations might well be
normatively justified
But these lending regulations have an additional consequence
in the larger loan context. Aside from the transaction costs that must
be incurred to contract around the background rules, there also would
likely be information effects as a consequence of the parties’ efforts to
contract around the background rules that would otherwise apply.
Prospective borrowers who show reluctance to facilitate the waiver of
59 On the economic analysis and significance of transaction costs, see POSNER, supra note
1, at 50-55; see generally Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. L. & ECON. 1
(1960).
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their sabbatical year, debt discharge rights signal to their prospective
lenders that they believe there is a significant risk of loan default.
Similarly, a prospective borrower who is uninformed of the
background default rules governing debt transactions (specifically, the
default rule requiring the release of the debt in the sabbatical year)
would of necessity become informed about the rule upon efforts by the
prospective lender to contract around it.
The first of these information effects—i.e., signaling 60 by
borrowers about the likelihood of default—unambiguously helps
lenders who learn valuable information from the contracting around
process that they could not learn without the presence of the sabbatical
release rule at the outset as the default regulatory mechanism. Perhaps
the value of this information effect more than offsets the lenders’
increased transaction costs. On the other hand, this information effect
helps only some borrowers (i.e., those with low default risk) while
hurting others (i.e., those with high default risk). On balance, then,
because it enables lenders to tailor their loans more efficiently for each
borrower, the first information effect is likely welfare-enhancing (from
a Kaldor-Hicks perspective), assuming that transaction costs are
sufficiently low.
The net consequences of the second information effect—i.e.,
the education of otherwise unsophisticated borrowers about the
background legal regime that governs lending contracts—are unclear,
but plausibly are also welfare enhancing. The effect unambiguously
hurts lenders by (a) raising transaction costs; (b) improving the
bargaining position of borrowers who would otherwise not think to
negotiate for such terms; and (c) not in any way helping the lenders
with respect to sophisticated borrowers. Sophisticated borrowers are
unaffected by disclosure of information that they already know, though
presumably, they would have higher transaction costs due to lenders’
efforts to contract around the background rule.
However,
unsophisticated borrowers benefit from the educative function of the
default rule, perhaps by an amount sufficient to offset their own
increased transaction costs as well as the increased costs imposed on
the lenders and on other borrowers.

60 On the economics of signalling in markets with incomplete or imperfect information, see
ERIC A. POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS 18-21 (2000); Dan M. Kahan, Signalling or
Reciprocity? A Response to Eric Posner’s LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS , 36 U. RICH. L. REV. 367
(2002).
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Overall, the welfare effects of imposing a contractually
waivable restriction on interest and a contractually waivable right to
cancel debts in the sabbatical year are difficult to assess. But under at
least one plausible set of assumptions, the net welfare effects are
positive.
Land. What we have asked about the land regulations we can
also ask about the loan regulations. If the restriction on perpetual sales
is effectively waivable by contract, then what effect if any does the
jubilee regulation really have? Again, the answer is somewhat
ambiguous as an empirical matter. On the one hand, the regulations
undoubtedly increases transaction costs, in the sense that parties to
land sales have to specify a term of years short of a fee simple sale in
perpetuity, whereas without the regulation they would not. This
limitation in itself should reduce the volume of land sales. Moreover,
the the land sale regulation text in the book of Leviticus may well have
“preference shaping” effects on tribe members (similar to those that
Miller suggests are caused by the Song of Deborah 61) which would
also tend to depress land sales by raising the price that a tribesman
would charge a non-tribesman and reducing the price that a nontribesman would offer to pay. Since there may actually be positive
externalities 62 associated with living in close proximity to other
members of one’s tribe—and because such externalities would be
magnified to the extent that inter-tribal land sales are reduced—a
reduction in land sales could in theory increase welfare. While this is
plausible under only a restrictive set of assumptions, it nevertheless
satisfies a normative defensibility standard.
VI.

CONCLUSION

This paper continues the work of law and economics scholars
to employ legal-economic analysis as a tool of biblical interpretation
and explication. The principal argument suggested in the paper is that
previous economic interpretations of biblical texts might well have
been improved if normative as well as positive analyses had been
undertaken. An effort to demonstrate the benefits of such a normative
61 Geoffrey P. Miller, The Song Of Deborah: A Legal-Economic Analysis, 144 U. PA. L.
REV. 2293 (1996), supra note 2.
62 On economic externalities associated with population characteristics, see Posner, supra
note 1, at 179-181; Shai Bernstein & Eyal Winter, Contracting with Heterogeneous
Externalities, 4 AM. ECON. J. 50 (2012).
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enterprise was attempted here. Three sets of biblical regulations—
those pertaining to leprosy, loans, and land ownership—were
normatively assessed, and all were found, under certain assumptions,
to be normatively defensible.

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2020

19

